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I take a cross-national analysis of advanced democracies to examine the cause of political violence 
in advance democracies in order to understand representation. I mainly look at the effect of 
political participation on political violence. I test a preliminary and the main hypothesis. The 
preliminary hypothesis confirms an institutional argument that inclusive institutions—that 
facilitate impartial political participation for the public provide proper avenues for political 
participation, therefore, mitigating political violence. I expect to see a negative relationship 
between political violence and regulation of participation. In the second part of the paper, I develop 
an argument consistent with the existing literature contesting that high voter turnout shows 
satisfaction with institutions, nonetheless by employing the median voter theorem I take the 
argument further and demonstrate that higher voter turnout will have a positive relationship with 
political violence—dissatisfied extremist groups in the margins rejecting the ballot box and opting 
for political violence. That is, as the majority gives legitimacy to the institutions through voting, 
extremists, who identify as the political minority, will try to make themselves relevant through 
political violence. They believe they are being squeezed out of the political space and react by 
resorting to political violence.  I present two cases studies of Germany and Nigeria to develop my 
main argument. I confirm that inclusive institutions have a negative relationship with political 
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In a Vice interview a renown Marxist Slovenian scholar set comfortably on a couch and 
utters the following words, “Every violent acting out is a sign that there is something you are not 
able to put into words…most brutal violence is the enacting of a certain symbolic deadlock.” 
Preceding this answer to an interview question he briefly mentions the fear that currently 
dominates European countries; immigration. Can this deadlock or the lack of political platforms 
that gives voices to certain groups under a state be associated with Marxist theories that connect 
violence to socio-economic factors? Marxist theories led violent movements throughout the 20th 
century (Jeffries 2012), but one will be hard pressed to find Marxist elements that motivate most 
of the rise of extremism in Europe, which has led to political violence. Most of the political 
violence happening in Europe is predominantly ideological and not economic. According to 
Beauchamp, 
“The current crop of radical…isn’t like old-school European fascists; their ideology isn't 
about toppling democracy. Nor is it primarily focused on the economy. Instead, it's about 
xenophobia: about marking Europe as a place for (mostly white) Europeans and keeping out the 
(mostly Muslim) foreign threats. And the past year — marked by a refugee crisis, a spate of 
terrorist attacks in Europe, and a failure of the traditional European elite to solve the country's 
persistent economic problems — created ‘perfect storm’ for the radical right's rise (2016).” 
Hence, in this case one has to deviate from the Marxist’s view of political violence and 
search for other mechanisms to provide an understanding of the rise of political violence in 
advance democracies.  What are the main causes of political violence in advanced democracies? 
This reaches to the very core of a democratic system—looking at advance democracies the 





advanced democratic systems epitomize representation then the assumption is public grievances 
are accommodated.  In the case of a developing democracy the answer is almost clear-cut—weak 
or less-inclusive institutions. But the same claim cannot be made for advanced democracies. 
Hence, further exploration into aspects of democracy should be undertaken.          
In the 1960s, there were waves of protests in advanced industrialized nations (Mayer 
2004). Since the end of WWII, there has been a threat posed by right-wing terrorism and 
violence in Western Europe. Existing research shows that right-wing terrorism and violence 
comes in waves, and scholars have tracked the most recent wave from the late 1980s to early 
2000s in most countries (Bjorgo 1997; Koopmans 1996; Merkl 1995). After a relatively peaceful 
period there is evidence of a new outbreak of right-wing terrorism in Western Europe and this 
have caused concerns about democracy (Bartlett and Birdwell 2011; Fekete 2016; Ramalingam 
2014). Waves of political violence have risen in recent years and most of it has been linked to 
economic and social factors. Terrorist organizations are likely to capitalize on the grievances of 
losers during economic crisis.  Therefore, terrorism and political violence is most probable to 
emerge during the period of low economic growth and development. Moser and Clark (2001) 
argue that political violence occurs in the public domain where it is mixed with economic and 
social violence. However, even though economic and social factors might lead to political 
violence, one has to investigate political factor that might create grounds for political violence. 
Millington (2016) demonstrates that violence remained a political phenomenon in democratic 
regimes of Western Europe, thus even though some countries are well advance there is still a 
presence of political violence. He examines left-wing and right-wing ideas and uses of violence 
in countries such as Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, as well as Italy and Germany to 





usually a result of political competition or search for political relevance by certain groups in 
society.  Political violence might also be a way to discredit the goals of electoral and democratic 
processes—representation of minorities or marginalized groups (Theophilus, Kingsley, and 
Aondowase 2013).  Thus, it is important to examine this competition and the dissatisfied groups 
in advanced democracies—especially minorities at the extreme end of the political spectrum. Do 
these groups feel like they participate equally in the political process?  Political violence may be 
an important measure of political participation and representation. Studies have shown that the 
level democracy can mitigate political violence (Hegre 2002) but due to condensed nature of 
democracy variables such as polity, polyarchy, and freedom house, to name a few variables, we 
cannot know which aspects of democracy reflect representation in the context of discontented 
groups, over other aspects. Therefore, can political violence help us understand the aspect of 
democracy that characterizes representation in a list of others?           
This paper seeks to show that political violence can improve our understanding of 
political representation. There are assumptions that mature democracy means equal 
representation: providing platforms for expressing grievances and that they are not prone to 
political violence. However, political violence can also occur in advance democracies. Hence, if 
this is the case, we have to find out if full representation is a given or perceived phenomenon of 
an advanced democracy, or if the institutions that facilitate representation are inclusive. It goes 
beyond just looking at the level of democracy to looking at what political violence can tell us 
about political participation—what aspect of political participation lead to political violence. Can 
these factors tell us why we see political violence in some advance democracies more than the 
others? To put it simply, indices such as the polity score create a black box that sometimes 





significance of other important aspects that are constitutive of the variable. Hence, instead of 
taking for granted that democracy is synonymous to representation I select one aspect of 
advanced democratic institutions—regulations of participation1, to avoid the assumption that 
advanced democratic institutions with all their aspects are synonymous representation. Once I 
have shown that democratic institutions indeed mitigate political violence—my preliminary 
investigation—I then proceed to undertake the task that this paper seek address. I give a counter 
intuitive institutional explanation, based on the median voter theorem of why we see political 
violence in advanced democracies.  By showing the fundamental relationship between the 
quality of institutions (that facilitate participation) and political violence, I explain why 
legitimacy matters. In short, as the mainstream political parties vie for the median voter, the 
extremist may resort to political violence rather than voting to get their message heard. The 
voting reflects the legitimacy of an advanced democracy especially for those who believe they 
are represented and have a voice in the system. Thus, it is possible that as voter turnout increases, 
those on the extremist left and right ends of the spectrum become more violent. However, as the 
extremists become more mainstream and larger traditional parties take on some of the extremist 
platforms, observed political violence may decrease because the extreme voices are getting their 
message across through the ballot box.      
I take a cross-national analysis of advanced democracies and look at the effect of political 
participation on political violence.  As stated above, I test a preliminary and a main hypothesis. I 
expect to see a negative relationship between political violence and regulation of participation, in 
preliminary hypothesis. I develop an argument consistent with the existing literature, that high 
                                                           
1 The concept of political participation could be conflated regulation of participation because they are similar in the 
wording. However, regulation of participation is part of political participation—these are institutions that facilitate 





voter turnout show satisfaction with institutions, nonetheless, I go beyond the existing literature 
and employ the median voter theorem to demonstrate that higher voter turnout will have a 
positive relation with political violence—dissatisfied extremist groups in the margins rejecting 
the ballot box and opting for political violence. That is, as the majority gives legitimacy to the 
institutions through voting, extremists, who identify as the political minority, will try to make 
themselves relevant through political violence. They believe they are being squeezed out of the 
political space and react by resorting to political violence.  I present two cases studies of 
Germany and Nigeria to develop argument.             
Literature Review  
Political Violence 
A broad body of literature has shown that political violence is mostly associated with 
weak democracies. Since weak democratic institutions would mean weak representation. 
Mansfield and Snyder (2002) argue that the early stages of democratization results onto a highly 
competitive environment in a number social groups and interests collide. There is a lack of 
competent state institutions that are strong enough to absorb or regulate intense political 
competitions. This is comparable to Samuel Huntington's gap between high levels of political 
participation and weak political institutions. According to Staniland (2014) the developing world 
is confronted with a combination of violence. Voting can create an environment of political 
violence. This has been witnessed in the Philippines, Pakistan, or Russia where electoral 
competition is marred with violence: “pro-state militias target the supporters of opposition 
parties; states use security forces to repress dissidents and intimidate the electorate; political 
parties build armed wings; insurgents attack voters and candidates; and local elites use elections 





Hence, it follows that in countries where certain groups are not given enough opportunity 
to express themselves in the political process there is a high likelihood that there will be high 
political violence. Countries that have showed the high level of political violence like Libya, 
Lebanon, Sudan, India, South Sudan, Kenya, Pakistan, Central Africa Republic and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo are developing democracies or dictatorships. In Europe’s late 
twentieth century political violence occurred in Ireland, Belgium and the Balkans where there 
were due ethnic and religious conflicts under authoritarian and developing democratic regimes. 
Theophilus, Kingsley, Aondowase (2013) demonstrate that societies that have less political 
development are more prone to political violence. Some of these societies are akin to 
Huntingtonian (1993) “The Third Wave” where societies are fractionalized. This is the case in 
multi-ethnic states where there is a dispersion of heterogeneous ethnic groups throughout the 
country, which live in specific geographic regions’ (2006).  
Nigeria is an example. According to Human Right Watch, Political violence was a 
serious threat to the legitimacy of the state and electoral institutions in 2003. The party primary 
elections for local government candidates began in mid-2002 and hundreds of people have been 
killed as a result of political violence in Nigeria and thousands have been displaced. This 
violence can be linked to heightened tension created by competition for public office. Ethnic and 
religious divisions often play a part in defining the lines of conflict and are manipulated by 
politicians for their own ends. This violence has been denounced by politicians, police and public 
commentators and have encouraged the prosecution of those responsible and have tried to 
discourage citizens to being part of the political violence. But all these actions have not resolved 
the existing problem—since it is at odds with ambitious politicians. Even political parties have 





accused their opponents of participating in political violence with little apparent basis, which 
exacerbates tensions that could lead to violence between their supporters (Human Rights Watch 
2003).” 
One of the main factors leading to political violence is weak institutions because it is 
difficult for weak institutions to gain legitimacy. In the Nigeria case study, a vicious cycle—
weak institutions affecting political legitimacy and lack of legitimacy weakening institutions. 
These institutions are not competent enough to provide representation; hence people feel the 
need to engage in political violence. According, Reilly (2006) new democracies have been 
damaged by pressures of social cleavages—there has been more effort put into preventing parties 
from forming along ethnic lines. After independence, Nigeria did not have strong institutions to 
contain existing social cleavages (Mbaku 2013). The Nigerian government has tried to prevent 
such political violence through electoral systems. Currently, Nigeria requires parties to show 
representation of different regions by including members from two-thirds of all states on their 
executive council and by being inclusive in their party mottos (Reilly 2006). Nonetheless, such 
measures have not brought solutions to political violence in Nigeria. 
In the 1990s democratic institutions became the means to settle disputes. Warring parties 
in different countries settled their differences through election that would determine who would 
lead the new government. This means to end war was characterized by the peace accords in 
Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia and Tajikistan 
(Lyons 2004). There were means in which solutions for issues like internal and external 
legitimacy came. An electoral process became an alternative to violence as it is a means of 
achieving governance. When the electoral process was perceived as unfair, unresponsive, or 





outside the established norms to achieve their objectives (Fischer 2002). Democracy is seen as a 
mechanism for inclusivity, therefore it can be means to ease existing grievances and political 
tension among groups in a society and it follows that countries with strong democratic 
institutions are more able contain political tension by accommodating grievances of certain 
groups in the societies. For that reason, one would not commonly associate political violence 
with advance industrial democracies. But, is this really the case? Germany is a good case to 
address this question.  
Recent reports have shown that there has been a surge in extremist violence in Germany, 
which has arisen in the midst of nationalist backlash to the country’s admission of more than a 
million refugees since 2015. This has also led to an electoral boost of the far-right party, 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Far right violence total to 1,408 in Germany in 2015, up from 
around 990 in previous year, according to a government report. In addition, there were 75 
recorded far-right arson attacks targeting asylum centers in 2015 and 918 attacks that were due 
political dissatisfactions. These were records from 2001. The major cause of this political 
violence is anti-immigrant, anti-Islam sentiments spread by the Free Democratic Party (FDP). 
This party has capitalized on the nationalist sentiments that fueling much of the violence. This 
surge of political violence is due to part of the population that feels that they are not represent in 
the democratic process.  Although, this political violence in Germany is not as serious as the one 
we see in Nigeria, there is political violence (Kremer 2012; Steinau, Reuter and Miriello 2016; 
Dearden 2017).   
What is the cause of this political violence?  Unlike developing counties, it is not due to 
weak democratic institutions.  Reilly (2006) suggests that the lack of representation can lead to 





provide inclusive2 representation, but is an advanced democracy with a polity score of 10 
synonymous to inclusive representation across the country? If that is the case does inclusive 
representation mean satisfaction of all citizens or do some still feel marginalized? What can 
political violence tell us about the lack of representation in developed democracies? What is the 
connection between participation, voting and violence? 
Political participation and violence  
Political participation is “actions that are operated by citizens aiming at influencing 
collective decisions on some level of the political system (Barnes et al 1979).” Political violence 
is not traditionally associated as the means of political participation. Kaase (2002) differentiates 
between conventional and non-conventional political participation. “Conventional participation 
includes activities such as voting or writing letters to the editor,” while “unconventional political 
participation includes activities such as signing petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, sit-ins, rent 
and tax strikes, traffic blockades and wild strikes” (Renn et al 19). Thus, activities associated 
with social unrest are frequently linked to unconventional political participation.  
The graph below (Figure 1) from the World Value Survey demonstrates to what extent 
citizens in an advance democracy are more likely to engage in unofficial strikes to give one an 
idea of unconventional political participation methods in advanced democracies. I compare the 
graph against a developing democracy to show that variations that are mostly institutional. The 
graph shows no much difference between Germany and Nigeria when examining the number of 
people who have engaged in unofficial strikes. But Germany has a greater percentage when 
examine how probable citizens are more likely to engage in unofficial strikes. There is no much 
difference in the percentage of citizens who might not engage in unofficial strikes.   
                                                           
2 Meaning they provide a level plain field for political participation for all groups willing to participate in the 







Figure 1. Political Participation: Joining unofficial strikes (1995-1999) (%) 
 
Source: World Values Survey  
 
Hence, why are citizens in advance industrial democracies likely to engage in non-
conventional political participation—activities associated with social unrest?  While unofficial 
strikes are not necessarily political violence, news reports from both countries demonstrate a 
level of political violence exists in both countries.  Is political violence the result of weak 
politically representative institutions? Unconventional forms of political participation may be 
means to express grievances if the corresponding system in which the conventional means of 
participation work is in urgent need of a radical reform. According to this assertion, political 
violence “is not necessarily dysfunctional but it is a manifestation, which appears as unexpected, 
unplanned, often spontaneous as well as unconstrained or uncontrollable within the functional 

















     Koopmans (1993) asserts “those social movements are characterized by low degree of 
institutionalization, high heterogeneity, a lack of clearly defined boundaries and decision-making 
structures and volatility matched by few other social phenomena (637).” The increase in violent 
actions against foreigners, refugees and other target groups in Germany are a characteristic of a 
lack of clearly defined boundaries and decision-making structures (Koopmans 1996). He studies 
Germany, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland and three Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway and differentiates the two forms of violence: racist violence that does not include an 
extreme right background and violence by extreme right groups that does not target ethnic 
minorities instead, it targets left-wing groups. Nonetheless, the presence of ethnic minorities in 
Western European countries had become the most important mobilizing issue for the right-wing 
extremist. Other factors have been ongoing migration crisis, prolonged financial crisis, rising 
Islamist terrorism, and growing support for radical right parties (Ravndal 2017). Ravndal (2017) 
looks at three causal conditions to political violence “the combination of high immigration, low 
electoral support for anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and extensive public repression of 
radical right actors and opinions; socio-economic hardship, authoritarian legacies, and extensive 
left-wing terrorism and militancy” …these…” contain elements of grievances and opportunities 
(133).”  
Villiger (2013) states that between 1968 and 1995 there were many violent acts 
committed in Switzerland due to political contestation. People got injured, some died, and there 
was serious damage to property. Explosives were used in most attacks. These attacks were 
signed and accompanied by political statements or demands. In all cases, the target was obvious 
enough to leave no doubt as to the intentions of those who did the bombing. In violent attacks 





mechanism that Ravndal (2017), Villiger (2013) and Koopmans present are characteristics of the 
limits of conventional political participation. The dissatisfied groups feel underrepresent or 
disadvantaged in the political structure in which they participate and they resort to non-
conventional means against the political system (Sanchezem 2006: 718). From an institutional 
perspective, I argue that introducing accommodating policies in participation (i.e. extreamists 
using the ballot box and becoming closer to the mainstream) may led to decreasingviolence. 
Hence, the way in which political participation is regulated might determine the occurrence of 
political violence in democracies. In this case, if regulations restrict or prefer some groups over 
others, the likelihood of political violence might increase (if there is violence it means that 
participation is restricted).  In this way, I look at political violence as one aspect of representation 
and democracy. Looking at official and unofficial forms of participation allows us to test one 
aspect of democracy (polity) and examine why political violence occurs in some democracies 
and not in others.  Therefore, the link between the level of political violence and regulation of 
participation can tell us more about equal participation than democracy. I argue that the intensity 
of political violence may increase as voting becomes a more legitimate method of participation 
for the majority.  However, the literature suggests the opposite.  That is, as the political 
institutions become more inclusive, such as expanded voting rights to all citizens, political 
violence should decrease. Thus, the hypothesis is:       
Hypothesis 1: The more inclusive is the regulation of participation the lowers the level of 
political violence. 
Regulation of participation is defined as the regulation of participation to the extent that there 
are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. Thus, direct 





Political violence is defined as political expression events, politically motivated attacks, 
disruptive state acts, or some other manifestation of discontent - can vary enormously in their 
intensity (Speed Database 2014). 
Once, institutions are inclusive for political participation and we expect them to mitigate 
political violence, although mitigating does not completely mean the absence of political 
violence. An easy answer can be political violence cannot be completely eliminated you can find 
it in any society, but that claim does not answer why it happens. If weak institutions have a 
relationship with political violence and there is connection between political violence and weak 
institutions, still, it does not answer why political violence happens in strong institutions. If the 
preliminary hypothesis is correct then citizen acceptance of the system (legitimacy) is reflected 
in voter turnout, and this should reduce political violence because “all” social groups have a 
chance to cast a vote.   
Legitimacy and violence   
Lipset (1959), Easton (1975, 1965), and Almond and Verba (1965) argue that political 
support for regimes is not a short-term process, it is a long-term process that develops on a 
record through the recognition of regime performance or the output of the system or support that 
has developed over time. In order to create the “system support,” the regime has to have the 
capacity to maintain order, to maintain the rule of law, and to otherwise respect human rights and 
the democratic rules of the game (Linde and Ekman 2003). On the other hand, democratic 
legitimacy (support for the principles of democracy) derives to a great extent from the long-term 
performance of the democratic regime (Linde and Ekman 2003). “Pharr and Putnam (2000) 
highlight widely decreasing confidence in political parties, parliaments, and politicians in 





shows confidence in the political system and parties reflects one way how citizens in an advance 
democracy legitimize their democratic institutions. Again, I compare an advance democracy with 
a developing democracy to show the institutional variations. I observe a concentration of 
sentiments that are moderately good and moderately bad for Germany; hence there seem to be a 
significance trust for political trust in the political system in Germany than in Nigeria. However, 
there is less trust in political parties in both Germany and Nigeria. With regards to Germany we 
could say that although there is less trust in political parties, there is still relative trust in the 
political system. This could mean that the majority of citizens still participate in the democratic 
process without any clear political leaning to a party or voters’ choices are fluid. I add that 
Figure 1 one still supports that there is a support for the political system in Germany, since there 
are more citizens who are unwilling to engage in unofficial strikes. Hence, the question this 
paper is exploring—if there seem to be trust in the political system by the majority why do we 
still see political violence in Germany?  
Figure 2. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today (1995-1999) (%) 
 





















Figure 3. Confidence in Political Parties (1995-1999) (%) 
 
Source: World Values Survey 
  
Anderson and Tverdova (2001) argue that established parties seem to have become less 
relevant and they have less utility to their constituencies, while, not surprisingly, they are 
privileged niche parties when it comes to their linkage to the state. These phenomena might be 
the reason for anti-party sentiments, emergence of new and protest parties and far-right political 
violence in western matured democracies. Studies have shown that party system performance 
and electoral institutions have an effect on democracy satisfaction. Hence, how institution 
performs is considered a better indicator of the extent to which citizens are supportive of 
democratic governance (Anderson and Tverdova 2001). Anderson (1997) demonstrates that 
losers are more likely to be satisfied with the resulting democracy despite their minority status 
provided there are mechanisms for “procedural justice in the democratic process or opportunities 
for input into the decisions made by the government (575).” If there are reforms in the 
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maintaining that winning is still meaningful, and giving the majority more power—allowing the 
implementation of policies preferred by the majority, the citizens satisfaction with democracy 
will increase and this will an effect on the longevity of the democratic system. According to 
Anderson and Mendes (2006) elections should be conceived primarily as mechanisms for the 
generation of popular support for the government and its policies and if elections do not achieve 
this goal the support for the government might be less. 
Pappas and O’Malley (2014) argue that social unrest is an expression of dissatisfaction 
with the political system, which influences the intensity of violence in protest activities that is a 
result of legitimation crisis. It is usually a result of social and ideological factors, closely related 
to political parties, interest groups, and dynamic of party systems and political competition. 
When states deliver public goods to citizens, they will not question the legitimacy of the state or 
threaten their integrity. However, when the state can no longer provide the public goods and the 
utility it represents for its citizens get diminished, citizens question its legitimacy. The uncivil 
disobedient in the United States complain about the inefficiency, inadequacy, and corruption in 
the political-legal institutions (Kirkpatrick 2008). It is noticeable that these phenomena are not 
solely restricted to non-democracies but they are very salient in advance industrial democracies 
such as German, Netherland, Sweden, and Norway.  
  It might also be hard for losers to perceive their government as legitimate even if the 
elections were free and fair, conversely, losers can ignore the fraudulent result since they benefit 
them (Moehler, 2009). Elections may be deemed free and fair by experts, but not by dissatisfied 
citizens, and vice versa. Hence, the viability of electoral democracy depends on how much it 
accommodates a substantial proportion of the public displeased with the outcomes of the 





Ezrow and Xezonakis (2004) and Powell (1986) shows that high level of voter turnout in 
elections is an indication of satisfaction with democracy. Hence, the level of turnouts at elections 
is often seen as an indication of the health of a democracy and legitimacy, therefore it should be 
expected to have an effect on political violence more than other kinds of participation because is 
it a sign of direct inclusive participation. In western democracies, there is a pattern of declining 
rates of electoral participation. This has brought about concerns over the decline in the 
legitimacy of democracy and raised questions whether elections can act as institutional 
connection between citizens and the state (Stud 2012). For that reason, if one where to make the 
argument for institution legitimacy, voter turnout is the major indicator for such a phenomenon. 
However, few studies examine voter turnout in relation to electoral institutions and 
representation that might lead to political violence.     
Thus, I argue that, although it is an indication of legitimacy, voter turnout does not, in 
itself, guarantee a decrease in political violence, especially in countries where there are 
minorities at the extreme end of the political spectrum. It does not measure individual legitimacy 
or acceptance of the system, but it only looks at political legitimacy from the majority of the 
population and generalizes to the whole of the population. This approach may disregard the 
perception of dissatisfied minority groups at margins.  However, I believe it is important to 
consider these perceptions to understand political violence in advanced democracies. Political 
violence in Europe comes from both left and right extremes (Koopmans 1996). This political 
minority groups are not relevant with regards to voter turnout; therefore, they might opt to 
convey their grievance in unconventional means of political participation—political violence. 
When minorities feel irrelevant in advance democracy because their interests are given less 





that their interests are made insignificant by a higher voter turnout and see the only way to make 
themselves visible in the political arena is through political violence. Higher voter turnout is an 
indication of the public majority’s satisfaction with institutions, however, I attempt to 
demonstrate that it is an indication of the dominant political majority overpowering of the 
minority (at least the minority perception), as a result they are pushed to respond violently and 
increasingly engage in political violence to gain salience. This is my point of departure. I adopt 
the Downsian (1957) median voter theory.   
According to Downs, high voter turnout may reflect mainstream parties’ success in 
attracting the median voter and does not account for the voter in the margins. Hence, the 
percentage of the voter turnout might be indicative of the median voter but since the median is 
the measure of where most voters are positioned in a polity the level of voter satisfaction in the 
margins is unknown. 
Figure 4. Downs Model of Median Voters and additional explanation of extremists   
 
             
Hence, despite the fact that the literature assert that high voter turnout is an indication of 





dissatisfied groups in the margins outlined by the red left and right arrow in Figure 5. This 
means that the issue that attracts the median voter, where the right and left blue arrows converge 
in Figure 5,  does not represent the interests of the voters in the margins and the fact that high 
voter turnout might legitimize institutions gives them more impetus to try to delegitimize 
institutions—to draw attention to their issue space—they are already minorities in the political 
arena and they feel like they are being squeezed out of the political platform when they realize 
that their interest are disregarded by politicians at the same time feeling that their voices will 
never be heard because a high voter turnout that does not benefit them indicate the endorsement 
of the electoral process that does represent them, thus they resort to political violence. Because, 
they feel like they are isolated in the midst of the majority, for example, the right-wing extremist 
political violence in Germany. Since, the decrease in their relevance is negatively proportional to 
voter turnout with ballots concentrated away from their interest, they will try to offset the 
political loss by engaging in political violence.     
Following from my previous argument, I can say that democratic institutions that are 
supposed to be inclusive in their nature, however they present an inevitable contradiction in 
advance democracies—when one pair attention to minorities in the margins. Even in most liberal 
democracies some people are going to feel left out and the occurrence of political violence will 
continue even when voter turnout is high. The case studies I provided earlier in this paper 
support this claim. Hence, my hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Higher voter turnout will increase political violence due to increase in minority 
dissatisfaction.    
However, this is making an assumption about the nature of the minorities at the 





that political violence is not the only way to display dissatisfaction. However, the literature 
shows that, in Europe, dissatisfied extremists have shown their dissatisfaction through political 
violence even in advanced democracies.  This pattern is observed in the German case.  
Analysis and Discussion 
Variables    
My paper uses the V-Dem 7.1 and the SPEED dataset. These two datasets are merged. 
Before merging, I select relevant variables and then select advanced democracies using the polity 
score of 10. However, I find that some countries that currently have a polity score of 10 did not 
have the polity of 10 in the past.  To account for time variation in the polity, I had to come up 
with a cut-off year—looking at period from 1991(the end of the cold war) to the present. 
Countries that where advanced democracies from that time to the present continued to be 
democracies unlit the present. Hence, only countries that had a polity score of 10 from 1991 to 
the present where consider for testing the hypothesis in this paper. This led to the loss of many 
observations but it was the most plausible way to measure the relationship between regulation of 
participation and political violence, because for a country to be considered an advanced 
democracy one has to account for how many years the country has been a democracy. One has to 
almost expect that a country should have a polity of 10 for the longest time period to the present. 
It would be reasonable to consider the Federal Republic of Germany as an advanced democracy 
year after the Cold War because one would assume that it would have taken a long time for 
Germany to have a uniform culture of democracy after the unification of West and East 
Germany. 
I experienced data problem when I was merging the V-Dem 7.1 and the SPEED dataset. 





year, for that reason, I calculated the average variables for every year. Political violence is 
operationalized as a continuous variable measuring the level of political violence from 1 to 20 
after calculating the average of the number that represented those multiple incidents the 
maximum of the variable was reduced from 1 to 4. This allowed me to have equal amounts of 
observation per year between the two datasets, hence made the data possible and compatible for 
merging.  
Figure 5. Political Violence   
   
Source: SPEED Data 
 
Figure 6 is a distribution political violence. There is a high concentration of low levels of 
violence close to 0 but most of it is concentrated between 1 and 4. What the distribution shows is 
that there can be a significant amount of low levels of political violence and high-level relative to 





characteristic of a polity 10 democracy if the distribution includes non-democratic and less 
democratic countries the maximum would be higher than it is.  The mean is show in Figure 5. 
    
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Political Violence 173 1.756808 1.3148 0 3.9 
Voter Turnout 173 57.76936 7.397213 42 70 
 
The voting turnout variable shows the voter turnout in each legislative election, and it is 
calculated as the percentage of the total population who actually voted in the election. In incident 
indirect elections, votes that are considered are the ones that are cast in the final election. “If 
electors have not been elected by citizens, only the number of actual electors is taken into 
account, which means that the degree of participation drops to the value 0. If an election to 
choose electors has been held, the participation variable is calculated from the number and 
distribution of votes in that election. National referendums raise the variable value by five 
percent and state (regional) referendums by one percent for the year they are held. Referendums 
can add the degree of participation at maximum by 30 percent a year. The value of the combined 
degree of participation cannot be higher than 70 percent, even in cases where the sum of 











Figure 6. Voter Turnout  
 
            
 
I use voter turnout and regulation of participation as my main independent variables. The 
distribution show that voter turnout is near evenly distributed with concertation 59% which 
explain the 57% percent mean in the Table 1.   
 Regulation of participation is defined as participation is regulated to the extent that there 
are binding rules on participation when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. 
This variable is drawn from the question: Is political participation regulated? The answers are 
ordered from 1 to 5. 1: Unregulated: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national 
political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity; 2: Multiple 
Identity: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political 
influence at the national level (parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected), 





are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple social 
groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government 
favoritism; 4: Restricted: Some organized political participation is permitted without intense 
factionalism but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are 
regularly excluded from the political process; 5: Regulated: Relatively stable and enduring 
political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion. 
No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded 
from the political process (V-Dem 7.1). The regulation of participation distribution seems to 
have few variations as one would expect when dealing with advanced democracies of a polity 
score of 10. More countries will have a score of five than less. One would expect the institutions 
of an advanced democracy with a polity score of 10 to be inclusive—which I mentioned in the 
earlier section. But I expect the minimal variation to be enough to show that inclusive institutions 
of participation have a negative relationship with political violence as the preliminary hypothesis 
propose. Although one would comment that the lack of variation in the observation might not 
give me an accurate measure of the relationship between democratic institutions and political—
hence, representation. I would argue that it is a valid point but my main focus is on the second 
hypothesis not the first one. The first hypothesis just lay grounds for the first one.        
Free and fair election, boycott, lower changer chamber system and civil liberties are my 
control variables. Free and fair election was coded in percentage of how many voters’ turnout for 
an elections and boycotts. Free and fair election connotes an absence of registration fraud, 
systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election 
violence. This an index variable formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor 





The lower chamber electoral system is operationalized on the bases of the question, 
“what was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the 
legislature?” The categories are as follows: 0: Majoritarian. 1: Mixed. 2: Proportional (V-Dem 
7.1). For this variable data was missing in some years and I had to impute data on the bases of 
the previous electoral system. For example, if the majoritarian electoral system (0) was the 
electoral system before the missing data and the one that follows after the missing data was a 
mixed electoral system, then the missing data, for the years, will be treated as majoritarian until 
we get to the year that has a mixed electoral system.  These imputations were made on the 
assumption that in the subsequent year after an identified electoral system the electoral system of 
the missing data did not change until there was an identified electoral system. In the cases where 
there was no change in electoral system before and after the missing data, in some years, the 
imputation maintained the same electoral system.          
The Civil liberties variable is from freedom house. It looks at freedoms of expression and 
belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without 
interference from the state. The more specific list of rights considered vary over the years. 
Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free). 
A boycott is a deliberate and public refusal to participate in an election by a candidate or 
party who is eligible to participate. It is an individual ordinal variable that is recorded on the 
basis of the question:  In this national election, did any registered opposition candidates or parties 
boycott? Answers range from:  0: Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the 
election; 1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they 
constituted a major opposition force; 2: Ambiguous. Some but not all opposition parties or 





force; 3: Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively 
insignificant ones; 4: Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections (V-Dem 7.1). 
Descriptive Statistics  
To test my hypothesis, before I run regression, I present further descriptive statistics to 
predict if there will be relationships that we will observe in the in the dependent and independent 
variables. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Participation    Summary of Political Violence 
 
  Mean             Std. Dev.    Freq. 
3  2.9625357        .41807        7 
5  1.705964     1.3158292    166 
Total  1.756808     1.3148002    173 
   
 
The decreasing mean difference suggest that I am likely to see a negative relationship 
between participation and political violence.  
Table 3.Correlation Coefficient  
Variables  Political Violence Voter Turnout 
Political Violence 1.0000 
 
Voter Turnout 0.1867 1.0000 
   
 
The correlation coefficient suggests a positive relationship between voter turnout and 





in voter turnout will lead to increase in political violence. Figure 7 is a graphic display of this 
relationship.  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics  
Electoral System  Summary of Political Violence 
 
Mean              Std. Dev. Freq. 
0 2.041547        1.1091766 47 
1 1.4539837      1.2421141 41 
2 1.7454322      1.4286544 85 
Total 1.756808         1.3148002 173 
 
When looking at mean differences electoral system also seem to have a negative 
relationship with political violence. However, I do not expect it to be significant because 
electoral systems my might be shaped by social and political environment. Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) demonstrate that electoral systems are shaped by socio-political and economic factors, 
which might vary from one country to another. Therefore, their relationship with public 
satisfaction might be relative to the environment—whether a majoritarian or a proportional 
system of representation is better might is more a subjective question than a significant empirical 
question—the relationship is there but I do not expect it to be significant. That means electoral 
institutions can have an effect but their subjectivity seems outweigh their effect. Hence, I do not 





Table 5. Summary of Political Violence  
Civil Liberties Mean            Std. Dev. Freq. 
   
1 1.69139        1.3347058 94 
2 1.8183333   1.2617695 68 
3 1.9354962   1.5486566 11 
   
Total 1.756808     1.3148002 173 
   
 
Civil liberties also show a negative relationship with political violence. Hence, we should 
expect it to have a negative relationship with political when we run the regression model 
although there is an observed relationship I would not consider it to be significant. Because they 
are a given in an advance democracy.   












Figure 7. Scatter of Political Violence and Voter Turnout   
 
After observing the descriptive statistics, I find the same patterns they show in the 
regression model below. However, some variables are significant while others are not.  The 





Table 6. Factors collated with political violence  
 
Variables                                           Political Violence   
Inclusiveness of Participation                                             -0.885**  
                                                                                     (0.275)  
Free Fair Elections                                                    0.533  
                                                                                     (3.881)  
Voter Turnout                                                           0.0436**  
                                                                                     (0.0139)  
Boycotts                                                                     0.237  
                                                                                     (0.181)  
Electoral Systems                                                    -0.209  
                                                                                     (0.129)  
Civil Liberties                                                            -0.0270  
                                                                                      (0.172)  
_cons                                                                           3.300  
                                                                                     (3.995)  
N                                                                                    173  
R-sq                                                                               0.114  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05,   ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
I run a multivariate regression model of all the independent variables on political 
violence. This measures hypothesis one:  






I find that the preliminary hypothesis is supported, the coefficient of regulation of 
participation -0.885 shows that there is a negative relationship between regulation of 
participation and political violence it is significant. This suggests that institutions have an effect 
on political violence and their inclusivity matters. But if most of the advance democracies are 
inclusive in their nature of representation why do we still see political violence in advance 
democracies.  
Hypothesis 2: Higher voter turnout will increase political violence due to increase in minority 
dissatisfaction.    
Voter turnout with a coefficient of 0.0436 is statistically insignificant. It suggests that the 
increase in voter turnout will lead to an increase political violence.  For that reason, this finding 
supports the main argument of this paper. This relationship can be seen also in descriptive 
statistics. Therefore, I can conclude that, indeed, higher voter turnout has a positive relationship 
with political violence because when there is an increase in voter turnout minority groups at the 
margins feel like the majority are giving legitimacy to the institutions that does not give 
representation. Therefore, they resort to political violence to make themselves noticeable and 
relevant in the political arena. Hence, democratic institutions might be strong but the extent to 
which they mitigate political violence is depends on to how they are given legitimacy by the 
minority to in the extreme ends of the political spectrum. 
One limitation of this study is the lack of data regarding individual attitudes and system 
support of the extremists and those who are participate in unofficial protests and political 
violence. I can only infer regarding who resorts to political violence by few surveys asking if the 
respondents were involved in illegal violent protests.  Even if a survey asked a political violence 





are suggestive and counterintuitive regarding inclusive democratic institutions and political 
violence.      
One implication is that by virtue of being an advanced democracy does mean that the 
public has full representation and lack of representation for some groups in a democracy.  This is 
a paradox that democratic societies have yet to resolve, hence political violence will continue to 
exist in advance democracy. The rate of political violence might vary but it will continue being a 
form of participation and an outcome of the democratic process even in advanced democracies.  
Hence, we should look at the rise of political violence by the far-right and left extremists as 
reaction to their shrinking political space.  
Another implication is that these extremist activists learn to work within the system and 
start to gain greater representation through legitimate political parties and voting.  Instead of 
broad anti-system platforms, extremists especially the far right may use single issue platforms to 
influence the mainstream parties and the public (i.e. median voter).  If these extreme right parties 
are able to gain greater support then the mainstream parties may move to the right and they are 
no longer in the margins.  It is also possible that this move away from the middle may erode 
some democratic values, but at the same time reduce political violence at least from the right 
extremists.        
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